The CareFlite v. AFL-CIO Saga Continues

The Northern District of Texas has held the mandatory arbitration mechanism of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) preempted a grievance which required interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), but did not preclude claims which were independent of the CBA.

In CareFlite v. AFL-CIO, No. 4:07-CV-334-Y, (N.D. Tex., February 11, 2011), CareFlite, a medical transportation company, sought summary judgment on two counts of the Office and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO (“the Union”) and Craig Hilton’s Amended Counterclaim. The dispute arose out of CareFlite’s discharge of Hilton, a pilot represented by the Union. In 2006, Hilton was discharged by CareFlite and filed a grievance with the Union. Although Hilton was reinstated, he was again discharged in 2007 for failing to complete a required training certification within one year as required by a CBA between CareFlite and the Union. Hilton then filed another grievance with the Union.

Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the grievance concerning Hilton’s discharge was not subject to the RLA’s mandatory arbitration mechanism because the CBA explicitly excluded the claim. More information on the history of the case is available here.

Because Count I was previously resolved by the Fifth Circuit, the Northern District of Texas only addressed Counts II and III of Hilton and the Union’s Amended Counterclaim. In the relevant portion of Count II, the Union alleged “that CareFlite breached the CBA when it discharged Hilton.”

According to the court, the question of Hilton’s discharge was,

preempted by the RLA because it grows out of an interpretation of the CBA and centers over the meaning of the CBA. Indeed, without the CBA, Count II would not exist. Nevertheless, Hilton and the Union argue that the Court should hear the merits of Count II because, in light of the Fifth Circuit’s determination that the ATPC-related discharge question is nonarbitrable, Hilton will have a right without a remedy if the Court now determines that Count II is preempted. This argument is unavailing, however, given that the language in the CBA excluding ATPC-related discharges from arbitration is the product of negotiations in which Hilton and the Union were involved. As the Fifth Circuit noted, “unions and employees can contract to exempt certain claims from arbitration through their bargained-for CBAs.” CareFlite, 612 F.3d at 322 (citations omitted). Thus, to the extent that Hilton lacks a remedy, it is partially of his own making–or at the very least, his union’s making.

Next, the court addressed Count III which alleged,

that CareFlite’s “treatment of Hilton since his reinstatement, including, but not limited to, CareFlite’s refusal to provide Hilton with additional time to obtain an ATPC Certification and CareFlite’s discharge of Hilton, constitute illegal discrimination and retaliation under [45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Third and Fourth (West 2010), of] the RLA.”

According to the court,

“[t]he assertion of any right that is not created by a CBA is . . . not subject to binding arbitration under the statute.” CareFlite, 612 F.3d at 320-21. That is, claims that are independent of the CBA are not “minor disputes,” and the RLA’s mandatory arbitration mechanism does not preclude or preempt their being brought in federal court. See id.

The allegation in Count III was,

independent of the CBA and, thus, is not precluded by the RLA’s mandatory arbitration mechanism. The CBA is not the “only source” of Hilton’s right “not to be discharged wrongfully” in this case. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 258. Rather, Count III arises out of Section 2, Third and Fourth, of the RLA, which “protects the rights of employees to engage in organized union activities without interference from their employer.” Silva, 2008 WL 4552779, at *6 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 440 (1989); Johnson v. Express One Int’l, 944 F.2d 247, 252 (5th Cir. 1991)).

Finally, the Northern District refused to grant CareFlite’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III. According to the court, CareFlite offered little analysis on its claim and the court was “not prepared to say that there are no genuinely disputed material facts with regard to Count III.”

The Northern District of Texas held the mandatory arbitration mechanism of the RLA preempted Count II, but did not preclude Count III of Hilton and the Union’s Amended Counterclaim. The court granted CareFlite’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II and denied it as to Count III.

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