Austin-based U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks granted MySpace.com’s Motion to Dismiss a number of claims brought by the family of a 14-year-old girl who was allegedly sexually assaulted by a 19-year-old she met on MySpace.com. Both the criminal prosecution of the 19-year-old and the civil suit against MySpace have garnered lots of attention both locally and nationally. The plaintiff in the civil case sought to apply duties developed in premises liability law to the internet; the plaintiff, if successful, would have had website owners and operators owe web surfers the same duties a landowner owes to invitees. Judge Sparks, in dismissing the case, noted that the application of premises liability law to the internet “would of course stop MySpace’s business in its tracks and close this avenue of communication, which Congress in its wisdom has decided to protect.” A website, in other words, is not a “virtual premises.” Howard Bashman posts a nice summary of the press coverage, including a link to the .pdf of Judge Sparks’ order, here. Technorati Tags: litigation, law

On Tuesday, the Third Court of Appeals issued an opinion dismissing a number of defamation claims brought by Williamson County’s District Attorney against the Smithville Times. The case involved a series of editorials about a Williamson County murder prosecution that ran in the Times in late 2001 and early 2002. The detailed opinion sets forth the burden a public official must meet to prevail on a defamation case. Texas Appellate Law Blog discusses the case here. Cox Texas Newspapers, L.P. et al. v. Charles Penick, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App. – Austin 2007) (Cause No. 03-05-00504-CV)

Barry Barnett’s Blawgletter discussed a recent Second Circuit arbitrability opinion yesterday (Ross v. American Express). The opinion holds that Section 16 of the FAA, which allows interlocutory appeal of an order refusing to compel arbitration, applies in cases where the motion to compel arbitration was based not on a written agreement to arbitrate, but upon estoppel principles by which courts sometime compel non-signatories to arbitrate (we have discussed this phenomena in Texas at length in the past). Section 16 of the FAA in turn refers to Section 3, which requires courts to send cases to arbitration when they involve issues “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such an arbitration” (emphasis added). In the Ross case, the party that had defeated a Section 3 motion to compel arbitration argued that no interlocutory appeal of that decision was possible, since no written agreement to arbitrate existed. According to the Second Circuit, however, the estoppel theories for requiring non-signatories to arbitrate actually create agreements in writing to arbitrate, thus satisfying the FAA’s written agreement requirement. In other words, if estoppel creates an agreement to arbitrate where none obviously exists, then it also creates an agreement in writing to arbitrate where none obviously exists. To hold otherwise, argues the Court, would completely derail the established movement favoring arbitration-by-estoppel. Thanks again to Barry for the heads-up on an interesting case. A link to the opinion is available on his site, for those interested Technorati Tags: arbitration, ADR, law

The Texas Supreme Court handed down five opinions this morning. None is about arbitration, so we’ll give them short shrift here. City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Properties is a discussion of the City of San Antonio’s potential police power to close access to certain roadways in order to address residents’ complaints about commercial traffic in their neighborhood. Cause No. 04-1130. In Norris v. Thomas, a five-justice majority holds that a boat cannot be a homestead (and thus protected from creditors) under the Texas Constitution, even if it’s a really big boat that is the primary residence of the debtor. “In order to qualify as a homestead, a residence must rest on the land and have a requisite degree of physical permanency, immobility, and attachment to fixed realty. A dock-based umbilical cord providing water, electricity, and phone service may help make a boat habitable, but the attachment to land is too slight to warrant homestead protection.” The opinion provides a nice history of Texas’ homestead protection. Cause No. 05-0476. Justive O’Neill wrote the dissent in Norris, arguing that the majority set forth a “cramped interpretation of homestead.” Since the Norris family actually lived on the boat, and since the majority acknowledged that it was in fact their home, the dissent argues that it ought to be given homestead protection. State Farm v. Martinez addresses the effect an insurance carrier’s interpleader of claim funds has on the Texas prompt payment of claims statute. Cause No. 05-0812. Wachovia v. Gilliam reverses a default judgment where substituted service was not made on the defendant at the defendant’s proper address. Cause No. 05-0903 In Jack in the Box v. Skiles, the Court reverses a Fifth Court of Appeals opinion and renders summary judgment in favor of Jack in the Box in a case where one of its truck drivers was injured on the job delivering some meat (Jack in the Box is a non-subscriber to workers’ compensation insurance). According to the Court, its earlier opinion in Kroger v. Elwood means that an employer has no duty to warn an employee about an obviously dangerous condition (we blogged on the Kroger case back in May). In this case, Kroger means that the truck driver could not recover against Jack in the Box for injuring his knees trying to jump over a broken lift gate on his truck, even though a Jack in the Box manager pressured him into doing so during a busy lunch hour when meat was scarce. According to the Court, since doing what the manager wanted was obviously dangerous, Jack in the Box did not have a duty to warn its employee of the danger. Cause No. 05-0911. Technorati Tags: litigation, Texas Supreme Court, law