In Part Nine, we discussed the rap on special masters – the concern that special masters can be expensive and potentially ineffective; prone to an alternative agenda; and chosen because of connections to the judge. We suggested that the fact that at least the federal rules include no regularized method of selection or apparent qualification for the job of special master does not help to beat that rap. So what would help?

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In Part Eight, we talked about how, notwithstanding all the apparent benefits special masters can have for civil litigation, there is a rap, rightly or wrongly, on special masters that they can be (1) expensive and potentially ineffective if they merely add another layer of decision-making to challenge; (2) prone to alternate agenda; and (3) chosen because of connections to the judge, rather than management skills or independence. Yet, here we ar

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We’ve now spent several posts extolling the virtues of using special masters in such fervent tones that the invention of sliced bread has begun to pale by comparison. So why aren’t people using special masters on a routine basis to obtain these terrific benefits?

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In the past few posts, we have been discussing how special masters can be part of making resolutions of disputes fair, just and efficient. Part IV focused on using special masters as hands-on managers to incentivize parties to avoid discovery disputes in the first place and to resolve discovery disputes quickly, fairly and with a minimum of expense when they do occur.

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In Part Four we began to discuss solutions (not just problems), and urged that a first step in incentivizing counsel to hold down litigation costs is to have a neutral oversee the process of discovery closely enough (1) to make it in counsel’s interest to act reason­ably in the first place; and (2) to rule on unreasonable demands or failures to respond to discovery quickly, so that they gain no tactical advantage.

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In Part Three we urged that, notwithstanding rules, admonitions and the fervent desire for efficient resolution of disputes, our current system of litigation creates incentives to drive up the costs of litigation. So how do we change these incentives?

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In Part Two we urged that, while rule changes can be of some help in getting parties in litigation to a fair and efficient resolution, they are not a complete solution. Our concern is that fundamentally, changing rules changes how the game is played, not the fact that it is a game. We said we need a change that changes the incentive to play itself and suggested that Special Masters can change these incentives. OK, money where your mouth is time:

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OK, so in Part One we all agreed that we need to give people a better choice than the one between a system of civil litigation that does a great job of permitting appeals, but is perceived to be, or is, too cumbersome or expensive to resolve disputes; and a system of arbitration that, one hopes, is cheaper, but does not permit, at least the judicial appeal that parties might wish to have available if the arbitrator gets it “wrong.”

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An article in the Spring 2014 issue of the ABA’s Dispute Resolution reports on the sad results of a 2011 Fortune 1000 ADR survey. The survey updated a 1997 study. The bottom line: in 1997, Fortune 1000 companies, tired of the expense and inefficiency of litigation, were overwhelmingly interested in using arbitration. In 2011, Fortune 1000 companies, tired of the expense and inefficiency of arbitration, were really more interested in mediation.

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