By Renée Kolar
On July 9, 2012 Lance Armstrong filed a lawsuit and a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in the Western District of Texas in an attempt to shut down the USADA case. (read the Complaint and TRO)
Order Dismissing the Case
However, six hours later, the Court dismissed (without prejudice) Armstrong’s suit in a strongly worded Order. The Court noted, “Contrary to Armstrong’s apparent belief, pleadings filed in the United States District Courts are not press releases, internet blogs, or pieces of investigative journalism.” “This court is not inclined to indulge Armstrong’s desire for publicity, self-aggrandizement or vilification of Defendants, by sifting through 80 mostly unnecessary pages in search of the few kernels of factual material relevant to his claims,” the Court said. (read the Order here) Armstrong was allowed to re-file an amended complaint within 20 days of the Court’s order- and he did the next day.
The Amended Complaint
Armstrong’s Amended Complaint of July 10, 2012 (read the Amended Complaint here) requests that the court find in favor of Armstrong and declare:
(1) Armstrong has no valid, legal or enforceable arbitration agreement with USADA that authorizes USADA to compel arbitration; (2) the Defendants’ have tortiously interfered with contract; (3) Defendants have violated fifth amendment due process requirements; and (4) Defendants have violated common law principles of due process.
No Valid Arbitration Agreement
Armstrong asks the court to declare that USADA may not compel to arbitration because Armstrong has no valid, legal or enforceable arbitration agreement with USADA. Armstrong argues that:
1) The International License Applications with Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) that Mr. Armstrong signed constituted a contract to which USADA is neither a signatory nor a party.
2) Defendants purport to bring charges under the UCI Anti-Doping Rules yet Defendants have no agreement to arbitrate under these disciplinary proceedings nor do they have the jurisdiction without a preliminary determination by the UCI that a doping violation has occurred. In this case, none of the requirements for delegation of authority to USADA have been met.
3) Defendants are bringing charges for a period between 1996 and 2005, yet Mr. Armstrong’s licensing agreements prior to 2004 made no reference to USADA and contained no agreement conferring any authority on USADA.
4) Even after 2004, UCI continued to retain jurisdiction over Doping Control relating to testing at international events and testing performed by UCI outside of competition. The charges brought against Mr. Armstrong for a UCI test done in 2001, 2009 and 2010 therefore remain under the control of the UCI.
5) The alleged arbitration agreement is unconscionable.
6) USADA arbitration will not provide remedies equal to those available in court thus depriving Armstrong of substantive rights available in court.
7) There was no meeting of the minds between Armstrong and USADA on the alleged arbitration agreement. Armstrong’s agreement was with UCI, not USADA.
8) By limiting the choice of arbitrators and training its own arbitrators, USADA has retained essentially the exclusive right to select the potential arbitrators in this matter.
9) There is inadequate consideration for the alleged arbitration agreement.
Tortious Interference
Mr. Armstrong claims that at all relevant times to this Complaint, he had a contractual and business relationship with UCI and that contract should govern the matters at issue.
This contractual and business relationship included, but is not limited to: (1) UCI’s control over results management, (2) UCI’s exclusive jurisdiction over alleged doping violations by Mr. Armstrong prior to 2005; (3) its exclusive jurisdiction over the drug tests upon which USADA relies including tests in 2001 and 2009–10; (4) its authority to delegate disciplinary responsibility to USA Cycling; (5) its duty to review proposed disciplinary proceedings against its license-holders; (6) its obligation to review the evidence and determine whether it constitutes reliable means of proving an anti-doping violation before any anti-doping charge is brought against Mr. Armstrong; (7) UCI’s exclusive jurisdiction and obligation to determine whether to authorize any disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Armstrong; and (8) UCI’s obligation to abide by the eight-year statute of limitations applicable to any alleged charge against Mr. Armstrong.
Armstrong argues that by proceeding with its charges in contravention of the UCI rules, USADA has tortiously interfered with UCI’s performance of its obligations. The result, he alleges, has caused UCI to be in breach of its obligations to Mr. Armstrong.
Armstrong contends that USADA had actual knowledge of Mr. Armstrong’s contract and business relationship with UCI and that USADA’s interference with this relationship was willful and intentional. Armstrong claims that USADA’s willful and intentional acts have proximately caused him damage and, unless enjoined, will continue to cause him irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
Fifth Amendment Due Process
Armstrong asserts that USADA acts under the color of the State in that, among other things, the U.S. government (1) was instrumental in the creation of USADA, (2) relies on USADA to carry out its obligations under an Article II international treaty (the International Convention Against Doping in Sport), (3) USADA acts as a regulator under an express grant of power from Congress, (4) the federal government provides a substantial portion (approximately two-thirds) of USADA’s funding, and (5) USADA otherwise fulfills functions ordinarily reserved exclusively to the State.
Armstrong claims that Defendants further act under color of state law in that, among other things, the charges brought against Mr. Armstrong by Defendants are based on evidence gathered as part of a joint two-year investigation with the United States government to investigate and bring criminal and anti-doping charges against Mr. Armstrong. He contends that Defendants worked hand in hand with the FBI, the DOJ’s Office of Criminal Investigation, the FDA, and the US Postal Service Office in joint coordinated activity with the State and its agents designed to develop and support the charges Defendants now seek to assert against him.
According to Armstrong, the rights afforded him in the fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, protecting against abuse of government authority in a legal procedure, have been violated. He asserts that Defendants have undertaken to deprive him of valuable property interests by banning him from competition for life, disqualifying his competitive results, seizing his medals and prizes, and imposing upon him costs and fines, without according him due process.
Armstrong alleges the infirmities of USADA’s arbitration procedures are in violation of the fifth amendment’s procedural due process. In particular, he identifies (1) the lack of a charging document that fairly informs Mr. Armstrong of the charges against which he must defend, (2) the absence of a right to cross-examine and confront his accusers, (3) the failure to produce exculpatory evidence, (4) the failure to disclose cooperation agreements or inducements provided by Defendants to witnesses, (5) the failure to provide investigative witness statements, (6) the failure to provide full disclosure of laboratory analysis, (7) the lack of impartial assessment of the accuracy of laboratory testing procedures, (8) the lack of an impartial arbitration panel, and (9) the absence of a right to a hearing upon appeal to CAS.
Common Law Due Process
Armstrong claims that Defendants have violated common law principles of due process by their conduct in violation of the UCI’s rules and USADA’s own rules. More specifically, Armstrong alleges that under the UCI rules, Defendants’ do not have jurisdiction over (1) bringing charges against Mr. Armstrong, (2) the UCI test results in 2001 and 2009–2010, nor (3) over the alleged violations prior to August 2005 that do not involve a positive test. Mr. Armstrong argues that UCI has not independently reviewed the evidence, determined that there is reliable evidence upon which the matter could proceed, nor determined that Mr. Armstrong is in likely violation of any anti-doping regulations within its jurisdiction as it is required to do before delegation of disciplinary proceedings under the UCI ADR. He asserts, the UCI has not delegated any disciplinary proceedings to USADA in connection with any such alleged violations. He claims furthermore that the UCI’s rules do not authorize Defendants’ conspiracy charges against Mr. Armstrong nor the bringing of a consolidated action against six respondents, including other respondents as to whom USADA lacks jurisdiction.
Armstrong contends that USADA’s charges against him also violate the WADA Code and USADA’s own rules (USADA’s Rules, Protocol for Olympic and Paralympic Movement Testing), including, but not limited to, the statute of limitations, the Review Board process, procurement of unreliable evidence from witnesses by improper means, and agreements as to disciplinary actions relating to witnesses.
Prayer for Relief
Mr. Armstrong seeks the following relief:
1) Temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
- against Defendants USADA and Tygart staying the asserted requirement that Mr. Armstrong elect, by July 14, 2012, or any other date, arbitration of the June 12, 2012 and June 28, 2012 charges, or accept the sanctions specified in those documents;
- enjoining Defendants USADA and Tygart from imposing any sanction, or imposing any costs or fines on Mr. Armstrong, or taking any action with respect to disqualification of competitive results, awards, titles, medals, or prizes held by Mr. Armstrong, based on the allegations in the June 12, 2012 and June 28, 2012 letters;
- enjoining Defendants USADA and Tygart from all other actions in furtherance of pursuing doping charges, imposing sanctions, or taking any action with respect to disqualification of competitive results, awards, titles, medals, or prizes held by Mr. Armstrong based on the allegations from the June 12, 2012 and June 28, 2012 letters;
2) A declaratory judgment against Defendants USADA and Tygart in favor of Mr. Armstrong on the following:
- Defendants lack jurisdiction to bring the charges asserted against Mr. Armstrong in the June 12, 2012 and asserted against Mr. Armstrong in the June 12, 2012 and June 28, 2012 letter.
- Armstrong has no valid, legal or enforceable arbitration agreement with USADA that authorizes USADA to compel arbitration;
- Defendants have violated USADA’s own rules and bring charges improperly against Mr. Armstrong;
- The charges asserted against Mr. Armstrong are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
- Defendants are state actors and asserted charges against Mr. Armstrong in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and common law principles of due process.
- Defendants are state actors and the arbitration and other processes to which Defendants assert the right to subject Mr. Armstrong are in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and common law principles of due process.
3) Damages against Defendants as to the fifth amendment due process claims.
4) Costs associated with the action and such other and further relief to which Mr. Armstrong may be entitled.
Related Posts:
- USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | What is the USADA? Disputing, July 16, 2012
- USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Allegations, Disputing, July 13, 2012
- Lance Armstrong | The Doping Controversy Continues, Disputing, July 12, 2012
Renée Kolar is a summer intern at Karl Bayer, Dispute Resolution Expert . Renée is a J.D. candidate at The University of Texas School of Law and holds an undergraduate degree in Applied Foreign Languages from l’Université Stendhal in Grenoble, France.
