Armstrong v. Tygart | Jurisdiction

by Renée Kolar

This coming Friday, August 10th 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, will have to decide whether or not it should enjoin Defendants from enforcing an arbitration deadline against Lance Armstrong while the lawsuit progresses. In anticipation of the hearing, this week we will be summarizing Armstrong’s complaints and Tygart and USADA’s responses in their motion for summary judgment.

Background

The U.S. Anti Doping Agency (USADA) notified Armstrong and other members of the team on June 12, 2012 of its opening of a formal action alleging anti-doping rule violations. (read the notification here). On June 29, the Anti-Doping Review Board made a unanimous recommendation to move forward with Armstrong’s adjudication process. Soon after, the USADA announced that three members of Armstrong’s team have all received lifetime periods of ineligibility as the result of their anti-doping rule violations in the United States Postal Service (USPS) Cycling Team Doping Conspiracy. (read more here)

On July 9, Armstrong filed a lawsuit and a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in the Western District of Texas in an attempt to shut down the USADA case. (read the Complaint and TRO). However, six hours later, the Court dismissed (without prejudice) Armstrong’s suit in a strongly worded Order. (read the Order here). Armstrong was allowed to re-file an amended complaint within 20 days of the Court’s order which he did the next day. Armstrong v. Tygart et al. , No. A-12-CA-606-SS. (read the July 10th Amended Complaint here).

On July 11, the USADA granted Armstrong an extension of up to 30 days (the original deadline was July 14) to contest drug charges while he challenges the case in federal court. If Armstrong doesn’t respond to the USADA doping charges prior to the end of the extension period and ask for an arbitration hearing to face the allegations, a lifetime ban will go into place and he could face the loss of his Tour de France titles.

In the meantime, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, set the date for this Friday’s hearing to decide whether the Court should enjoin Defendants from enforcing an arbitration deadline against Armstrong while the lawsuit progresses. Read the Order here.

Amended Complaint—USADA Has No Jurisdiction

Armstrong claims that Defendants’ attempt to establish jurisdiction over him under UCI Anti-Doping Rules (UCI ADR) is improper because Defendants have no agreement to arbitrate under these disciplinary proceedings with Mr. Armstrong.

Armstrong argues that prior to 2004 and the creation of USADA, his license agreements with UCI made no reference to USADA and contained no agreement conferring any authority on USADA. Nor did, UCI’s ADR confer any authority on USADA. After 2004, Armstrong asserts, UCI continued to retain jurisdiction over Doping Control relating to testing at international events and testing performed by UCI outside of competition. He argues, therefore, that the charges brought against him for a test conducted in 2001 at an international event, as well as testing done by UCI in 2009 and 2010, fall under UCI’s jurisdiction.

Armstrong further contends that Defendants also lack jurisdiction to assert the charges against Mr. Armstrong because the charges were “discovered” within the meaning of the UCI ADR by UCI, not Defendants, by virtue of an e-mail from Floyd Landis (a UCI “License-Holder”) sent to USA Cycling (a member Federation of UCI).

Finally, Armstrong claims Defendants do not have jurisdiction without a preliminary determination by the UCI that a doping violation has occurred. Armstrong asserts that UCI cannot, under the UCI ADR, delegate its authority until UCI has independently concluded that it is likely that a violation of the UCI ADR has occurred. In this case, Armstrong argues, none of the requirements for a delegation of authority have been satisfied: UCI has not determined for itself whether an anti-doping rule violation has taken place; asserted that an anti-doping rule violation has taken place; expressly requested that USA Cycling (much less USADA) initiate disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Armstrong; or given notice to Mr. Armstrong of such a request, as required by the rules.

USADA’s Motion to Dismiss—USADA Has Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (The Sports Act), establishes arbitration as the exclusive forum for disputes relating to athlete eligibility in sports that are part of the Olympic movement, including cycling and triathlon. They contend that Congress gave the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and National Governing Bodies (NGB)—like USA Cycling—exclusive jurisdiction over eligibility for competitions.

Defendants claim therefore, by virtue of his membership in USA Cycling (whose regulations incorporated USADA Protocol, including AAA arbitration), his obtaining an annual license through USA Cycling, and his inclusion in the USADA Registered Testing Pool (RTP), Armstrong, agreed to be bound by the USADA Protocol making USADA’s jurisdiction proper.

Defendants argue in the alternative that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies under the Sports Act and USADA Protocol. They argue that courts interpreting the Sports Act have consistently held that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing any court action against a NGB.

Finally, Defendants contend that, in the alternative, under section 3 of the FAA, a trial court must grant a stay pending arbitration if the issues in a complaint are within the reach of an arbitration agreement. Defendants assert that since all of Armstrong’s challenges to arbitrability are clearly and unmistakably matters for the arbitrators to decide in the first instance under the AAA Rules, dismissal is appropriate.

Related Posts:

• Armstrong v. Tygart | Existence of Agreement to Arbitrate, Disputing, August 6, 2012
• The International Convention Against Doping in Sport of 2005, Disputing, August 2, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA’s Successful Arbitration Track Record, Disputing, August 1, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part VI | Right to Appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Disputing, July 30, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part V |USADA Expedited Track, Disputing, July 26, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part IV | The Arbitration Hearing, Disputing, July 25, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part III | The Appointment of Arbitrators, Disputing, July 24, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part II | The Review Board Track, Disputing, July 23, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | USADA Files Motion to Dismiss Lance Armstrong’s Suit , Disputing, July 21, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part I | USADA ‘Results Management,’ Disputing, July 19, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Texas Federal Court Will Hear Lance Armstrong Case on August 10, Disputing, July 18, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Lance Armstrong’s Suit and Restraining Order against USADA, Disputing, July 17, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | What is the USADA? Disputing, July 16, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Allegations, Disputing, July 13, 2012
• Lance Armstrong | The Doping Controversy Continues, Disputing, July 12, 2012

Renée Kolar is a summer intern at Karl Bayer, Dispute Resolution Expert . Renée is a J.D. candidate at The University of Texas School of Law and holds an undergraduate degree in Applied Foreign Languages from l’Université Stendhal in Grenoble, France.